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Using Trust and Possibilistic Reasoning to Deal with Untrustworthy
Communication in VANETs
Andrew Koster1 Andrea Tettamanzi2 Ana L. C. Bazzan1 Ce´lia da Costa Pereira2
Abstract—VANETs allow for unprecedented amounts of
information to be sent between participants in traffic. Unfortu-
nately, without countermeasures, they also allow selfish agents
to take advantage of communication to improve their own
utility. In this paper we present a novel framework for dealing
with potentially untrustworthy information. The framework
consists primarily of two components: a computational trust
model for estimating the amount of uncertainty in received
information and a possibilistic beliefs-desires-intentions agent
system for reasoning about this uncertain information in order
to achieve the driver’s goals. We demonstrate the framework’s
effectiveness in an easy to understand but realistic scenario of
a freeway system in which we also show that deceit may have
a larger impact on traffic flow than previously thought.
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent article reports that, by 2015, 80% of the cars
that the Ford Motor Company sells on the US Market
will have wireless communication technology built in [1].
The same article cites other suppliers of car to car (C2C)
communication technology; all of them expect a large growth
of sales in the near future. This will enable the upcoming
generation of cars to communicate directly with each other
using an ad hoc network. Some initial applications of the
technology are already being experimented with, such as the
Cooperative Forward Collision Warning, which assists the
driver in avoiding rear-end collisions with other vehicles [2].
Nevertheless, much of the potential for this technology is
still unexplored. In particular, the use of communication in
order to assist the driver for non-safety related tasks, such as
signalling other drivers about upcoming congestion, is still
very much an open issue.
One major problem in inter-vehicular communication is
that selfish agents may be better served communicating
false information than the truth. Agents may not just try to
choose actions that optimize their utility, but actively attempt
to deceive others in order to improve their own utility.
Such deceitful agents are incompatible with approaches to
cooperative driving, such as the one described by Bejan and
Lawrence [3], where agents’ truthfulness is a necessary pre-
requisite to obtain accurate information about the state of the
road. Such truthfulness, however, cannot be expected in many
traffic situations. For instance, if a deceitful driver knows that
the highway he wants to take is congested, he is best suited
convincing other drivers that it is clear, in order to avoid
heavy traffic on the alternative road. Kraus et al. [4] analyzed
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a traffic scenario in which deceitful agents can exploit C2C
communication over a VANET, in order to optimize their
own travel time. Their research indicates that the effect of
deception on travel times is low, however the simulation is
for a downtown environment with all cars moving in different
directions. We expect that misinformation is more serious on
major arteries, such as those used by commuter traffic, where
the origin and destination of the drivers are more similar.
Kraus et al. also present some approaches to obtain truthful
information in environments with deceiving agents. Firstly,
they propose to take historical information about the road
into account when evaluating received information. This is
a way of evaluating the trustworthiness of received infor-
mation, by comparing it with another information source.
We consider historical data about the road as an alternative
source of information, but using it to evaluate communicated
information a priori defeats the purpose of communication in
the first place: we require communication specifically when
other sources of information are insufficient. In a similar way,
they consider communications from trusted sources, such as
ambulances or police cars. This is similar to considering a
centralized source of information, such as a GPS path finding
service, or the news broadcast by the radio. Such sources
have no incentive to lie, but are often unavailable, or provide
outdated information.
Instead of relying only on trusted channels, which may be
expensive or unavailable, we propose a new framework for
reasoning about communicated information. We emphasize
that while the individual techniques used are not new, their
combination and application to evaluating the truthfulness of
communication in VANETs is. We use a possibilistic beliefs-
desires-intentions (BDI) framework, as first presented by da
Costa Pereira and Tettamanzi [5], to reason about the uncer-
tainties stemming from the various sources of information.
The use of an intelligent agent model has various advantages.
The first is that it is essential for the automated transmission
of messages: deciding what message to send and when to
send it is a complex decision, especially as bandwidth in
a VANET is limited. Second, an intelligent agent can help
with the interaction with the driver. As more and more
information is available to the user, it becomes increasingly
important to reduce the information overload. Intelligent
agents are eminently suited to this task [6]. Moreover, a BDI
framework allows for reasoning about the communication
and the source; thereby providing a context in which the
trustworthiness of his message can be assessed.
The BDI framework we are using here has two important
features: it allows to consider information from sources
which can be partially trusted and updates the agent’s beliefs
with respect to both new information and the associated trust
degree and it proposes a reasoning model to generate the
agent’s goals under the new situation. Because our approach
is possibilistic, unlike Kraus’ approach, which necessarily
needs historical data, ours can work even when the available
data is incomplete and a qualitative ordering of the trusth-
worthiness of the sources is the only thing that is available.
To deal with deception in C2C communication we use a
computational trust model. Many computational trust models
have been proposed for a variety of domains [7]. As Zhang
[8] points out, however, C2C communication faces problems
that are not addressed in such models. Most conventional
trust models rely on repeat interactions with an individual
agent to build up a trust relationship. In the absence of such
repeated interactions, they turn to their peers, who may have
repeated interactions, or a centralized authority that holds
reputational information. Unfortunately, in communication in
a VANET, none of these methods are available. The massive,
decentralized nature of a VANET makes repeat interactions
with a single car unlikely, and precludes the presence of a
centralized source of reputation information. We present a
trust model in Section II-A that considers the VANET as a
whole as a single source, and also deals with aggregating
information from other sources such as a GPS path finding
service or institutional sources.
In Section III we discuss the experimental setup, in which
we demonstrate the effect deceitful agents can have on traffic
flow, and how our model improves the situation. We conclude
this paper in Section IV.
II. OUR FRAMEWORK
Our method for dealing with uncertainty in C2C com-
munication uses an autonomous agent framework to reason
about all received information, and to use this intelligently
to achieve the user’s goals; regardless of whether this is
communication about congested roads, as we discuss in
this paper, or communication about free parking spots or
hazardous situations on the road. The main building blocks
of this system are (1) a computational trust model that is able
to assess the trustworthiness of various information sources,
in particular C2C communication, and (2) a possibilistic
BDI agent, to reason about uncertain information and make
decisions. We describe both these systems in detail in this
section.
A. Trusting communication
Cars equipped with modern communication technology
will be able to receive information from a variety of sources.
We consider C2C communication devices in particular, but
other information sources are taken into account as well.
For instance, GPS-based path planning services, such as
Google Maps or TomTom already provide information about
traffic conditions to their clients, and government authorities
could use wireless communication with cars, in addition to
the already present methods — such as digital information
boards on freeways or counters with free parking spaces in
the inner city — for communicating to cars on the road.
We do not consider any of these sources to be inherently
better than any other, but rather use a computational trust
model to evaluate information from each of them. Addi-
tionally, we consider different types of messages separately,
allowing the context to be taken into account when consid-
ering each source. For example, consider that government
authorities may be very trustworthy when supplying infor-
mation about traffic congestion, but their information about
available parking spots is found to be out of date. In this case,
we should treat information from the government authority
about congestion differently from that about parking spaces:
the trustworthiness of the source is dependent on the context
of the message. After analyzing the trustworthiness of each
source individually, the information from various sources is
combined, using a consensus operator [9] and passed on to
the possibilistic BDI agent, which reasons about how the
communication affects its plans.
1) Trust and context: Before we discuss the trust model
and consensus operator, we need to define the messages
that are sent. We assume that the content of the message
uses a shared communication language LComm. An example
of such a language, which might be used in a full-scale
implementation, is the one specified by the Ontology of
Transportation Systems [10]. In this work, however, we
restrict the communication to the set of literals of a First-
Order Language. We introduce this restriction for the sake of
simplicity. Firstly, bandwidth and computational power is at
a premium in VANETs: by restricting messages to literals,
we restrict their size, as well as the computation required
for processing them. Secondly, it allows us to define message
contexts as predicate symbols. In a richer language, message
contexts can also be defined (using, for instance, clustering
with a distance measure over the language), but this is outside
the scope of this paper. The context of a message allows us to
generalize over multiple messages with similar content: these
other messages allow for the trustworthiness to be evaluated.
To obtain the context of a message, we take advantage
of the structure of First-Order Logic and we define each
predicate (also called a property) as a separate context. Mes-
sages, being literals, communicate a property of a constant
(which represents an object in the world). For any literal p in
the communication language, we denote its context using the
function context(p). Because communication is restricted to
literals, a message will always belong to a single context.
The computational trust model assigns a trust evaluation
to each message, dependent on the source’s trustworthiness
with regards to the message’s context. For most sources,
we can rely on existing trust models, because these sources
are persistent. We can use the truthfulness of past messages
to evaluate the source’s trustworthiness. We therefore do
not consider this in much detail, but assume that a trust
evaluation is a numerical evaluation in the range [0, 1],
which we can interpret as the likelihood that the source
will communicate truthfully. We refer to Pinyol et al. [7]
for a recent survey of trust models for multi-agent systems.
They also show that most contemporary models compute an
evaluation that can be interpreted in the manner described.
Information from C2C communication, however, must be
treated differently. A VANET allows for direct communi-
cation with hundreds, or even thousands, of other cars and
the chance of a repeat interaction with any individual car is
small. Furthermore, it would require a large amount of stor-
age to maintain a database of messages previously received
from each car. We therefore consider all C2C communication
together as a single source of information. In other words,
the VANET, rather than individual cars, is considered as
a source of information, whose trustworthiness must be
evaluated. Additionally, when doing this, we need to take
into consideration when a message was sent: which messages
do we aggregate together and consider as a single piece
of information that is provided by the C2C communication
source.
2) Trust in a VANET: In order to combine information
received over a VANET with information from other sources,
we must aggregate it into a similar structure: a single
predicate in LComm and an associated trustworthiness. To
assess this, we use Maximum Likelihood Estimation.
We make a slight adjustment in that we only consider re-
cently received information. We define a threshold Pcontext,
a maximum period of time that may have passed for the
message to still be relevant. This threshold is dependent on
the context, because some messages describe events that are
only true for a very short period of time — for instance, a
bridge being open — whereas others, such as congestion,
take longer to become invalidated.
When communicating, a source states that either the atom
p is true or false. We thus consider each such message
as evidence for the statement p: all messages stating p
support it, and all messages stating ¬p conflict with it. Over
the VANET, the agent may receive many messages both
supporting and conflicting an atom. We therefore consider
that C2C communication gives a likelihood for the message
content. The frequency of any atom p, as given by C2C
communication, is FC2C(p) =
|M(p)|
|M(p)|+|M(¬p)| , where M(p)
is the set of messages received at most Pcontext time ago,
that contain p.
However, this is only the likelihood that the new informa-
tion is truthful, not taking into account prior communications.
To obtain the actual trustworthiness in the information, we
must further take the trustworthiness of the source into
account. The trust we can place in the communication of
atom p, as communicated through a VANET is as in Eq. (1),
where Trust(C2C, p) is the trustworthiness of the source
C2C in context(p).
TC2C(p) = Trust(C2C, p) · FC2C(p)
+ (1− Trust(C2C, p)) · FC2C(¬p)
(1)
To calculate Trust(C2C, p) we use BRS [11], a simple,
but widely used statistical trust model. In particular, we use
one of the extensions proposed by Jøsang and Ismail, which
allows for discounting older information. This is crucial
in such a dynamic system as a traffic network, where the
number of trustworthy cars may change over time. Moreover,
we can only consider those messages for which we know the
true state of the world. This information could be obtained
by evaluating sensor data, such as the odometry of the car,
or by obtaining information afterwards; for instance, from a
trusted, centralized, database when the car is in its home
garage. This provides the agent with a knowledge base,
and we evaluate the truth of messages in comparison to
this knowledge base. The trustworthiness of a source is the
posterior likelihood of communicating a truthful message.
3) Aggregating over different sources: When evaluating
how trustworthy the information concerning a specific atom
p is, we must aggregate information about p from various
different sources, each with their own trustworthiness. Sim-
ilar to the case of C2C communication, we must take into
account that the sources may disagree. This is a similar prob-
lem to that encountered in data fusion for sensor networks,
but most data fusion methods rely on the measurements over
time and are not applicable to the problem we consider.
Jøsang proposes to use a consensus operator [9], which is
specifically designed to take advantage of the trustworthiness
of different sources.
We wish to consider all sources equally, weighted by
their trustworthiness. We thus use the same insight that we
used in computing the trustworthiness of a message in C2C
communication (see Eq. (1)): we consider events as binary
and if a source communicates p with trustworthiness t, it
can also be seen as communicating ¬p with trustworthiness
1 − t. We use this property in the fusion of information
from different sources and compute the trustworthiness of
p as the mean of the trustworthiness of all the sources’
communication of p.
We use the result in reasoning about the communicated
information. In particular, we have to reason about its trust-
worthiness in comparison to other sources of information,
such as the car’s odometry data or a GPS signal. For this
we need to interpret the trustworthiness of the information
in terms of beliefs. We thus update the agent’s belief base
with the new information and its associated trustworthiness.
The possibilistic BDI framework takes care of the rest, as
briefly discussed in the next section.
B. Reasoning about uncertain information in traffic
The communicated information must be combined with
other available information and a decision must be made
based on this in order to best achieve the user’s goals. Such
goals can be, for example, to get home as fast as possible,
or park the car near a supermarket. The information an
agent has available is uncertain and possibly incomplete.
We thus need a goal-oriented reasoning system that can
deal with uncertain, incomplete information. For this we
use the possibilistic BDI model that was first proposed
by da Costa Pereira and Tettamanzi [5]. The model has
two features in particular that make it uniquely equipped
for decision-making in traffic. The first is that it performs
automated belief revision. The agent has multiple sources of
information. So far we have focused on communication, but
this is only part of the picture: it must use this information
together with information from other sources, such as a GPS
signal, odometry data or lidar. Such information is more or
less accurate and must be integrated correctly in a belief
base. The proposed model provides a way of doing so in
accordance with the AGM postulates of belief revision [12].
Even more important is that the model takes the uncer-
tainty of its beliefs into account when selecting goals. The
best set of goals to be pursued is not only dependent on
the utility that can be obtained, but also on the feasibility
of actually achieving the goal. The process of selecting
goals must thus deal with the uncertainty of information.
For instance, if the GPS signal fails, then it is unfeasible
to give the user navigation instructions and instead of doing
so erratically, it may be better to display other information,
such as a roadmap with the route and last known location.
Similarly, if we received trustworthy communication that
there is no street parking available downtown, it may be
better to direct the user straight to a parking garage, rather
than waste time going around the block, whereas going
around the block may be the preferred action if there is more
uncertainty about parking availability.
In this paper we explain the use of the possibilistic
BDI framework using an example, which we will use for
evaluating the framework in Section III. For technical details
of the framework we refer to [5].
III. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In the previous section we presented a framework for deal-
ing with uncertain communication. We empirically demon-
strate its applicability in this section. The scenario represents
a freeway with a single alternative route. For example,
consider the map in Figure 1a. The thick red line repre-
sents the major freeway between Utrecht and Amsterdam,
two large cities in The Netherlands. This freeway is often
congested with commuter traffic between the two cities and
the surrounding towns. However, all the alternatives are slow
roads that twist around the countryside (we have drawn one
of them in blue). Usually, as it is the case here, there are a
number of alternatives, but we focus on just one (the shortest,
as calculated by Google Maps) to keep the example scenario
clear. The framework as presented can equally well deal with
multiple different routes: it is simply more information that
must be taken into account.
A. Scenario
The road network is represented in the graph of Figure
1b. All agents have the aim of traveling from A to C. In
node B they can switch from the freeway onto the side road,
or vice versa. We consider the cost of each edge i as the
time it takes to travel along it from start to finish, which is
dependent on the speed with which drivers can move along
it. This, in turn, is dependent on the amount of traffic T
on the edge. We base this relationship on the fundamental
diagram of traffic [13] and some basic assumptions about the
road. The maximum speed vmax along the freeway is 120
distance/time, whereas the side road has a speed limit of
60 distance/time. An edge is never completely blocked, and
(a) Example of a road map for the
experimentation ( c© 2012 Google)
A
B
C
costfreeway(T )
costfreeway(T )
costside(T )
costside(T )
(b) Graph representation of roads
for experimentation
Fig. 1: Experimental scenario
there is a minimum speed vmin of 10 distance/time along the
freeway and 5 distance/time along the side road. We use the
sigmoid function v(T ) = vmax
vmax−vmin
1+e5−T/1000
to represent the
fundamental diagram in a continuous function, resulting in
the speeds dependent on the amount of traffic T . The speed
is normalized around a maximum occupancy of both roads
at 10, 000 cars, an easy number for use in the simulation.The
cost is then simply the distance over the speed. In addition
to allowing a higher speed, the freeway is shorter. The two
edges along the freeway are 120 distance units each, whereas
the side road is 1.5 times as long, with each edge being
180 units long. Note that all values are arbitrarily chosen,
although it is normal for side roads to be both longer and
slower than the main route.
With 10, 000 cars traveling along the network, there is a
unique mixed Nash equilibrium, in which each car chooses to
go along the freeway with probability 0.6358 and otherwise
along the side road, resulting in a cost of 3.69 each. However,
we will assume cars with no prior information do not know
about the amount of traffic and will always choose to travel
along the freeway. The only situation in which a driver
considers the side road is if he receives some information
indicating that the freeway is congested. In such cases
the side road may be a better alternative for reaching his
destination.
A driver considers the freeway congested if he is forced
to drive slower than half the maximum speed, which occurs
at an occupancy of 5, 183 cars. For the sake of simplicity,
if the freeway is congested at the start of the simulation,
there are 6, 000 cars on it. We run the simulation with a
further 4, 000 cars that have the ability to communicate and
reason about the communication. We further assume that
20% of the reasoning agents have access to some form
of prior information, informing them whether an edge is
congested or not. They may then choose to communicate
truthfully or not. We further assume that any car that does
not have prior information does not attempt to create chaos
and fabricate messages. We choose 20% of the cars having
prior information in order to ensure there are enough cars
that may communicate.
B. Agents
The use of trust in interpreting communication is a
straightforward application of the equations in Section II-
A. To reason about the communication and decide whether
to take the freeway or the alternative road, we program a
possibilistic BDI agent as follows.
Firstly, there are only two beliefs to consider: (1) in(n),
the belief that the agent is in node n of the network, and (2)
isCongested(e), the belief that edge e is congested. Secondly,
the agent must decide which road to take based on its beliefs.
For this there are three high-level actions: freeway(xy) (take
the freeway to go from x to y), sideroad(xy) (take the side
road to go from x to y) and stop.
Reasoning about which action to take is performed using
desire-generation rules as follows:
if B(in(A)) and 0.01 then freeway(AB),
if B(in(A) ∧ isCongested(AB)) then sideroad(AB),
if B(in(A) ∧ ¬isCongested(AB)) then freeway(AB),
if B(in(B)) and 0.01 then freeway(BC),
if B(in(B) ∧ isCongested(BC)) then sideroad(BC),
if B(in(B) ∧ ¬isCongested(BC)) then freeway(BC),
if B(in(C)) then stop.
Here, B(φ) represents the degree to which the agent be-
lieves formula φ, and the 0.01 constants appearing in the
antecedents are a generalization of the logical constants ⊤
and ⊥, i.e., 0.01 is an atom whose trustworthiness is 0.01.
The trustworthiness of beliefs gives a priority ordering over
the rules. In this case, if congested(AB) is believed with a
trustworthiness greater than 0.01, then the sideroad will be
chosen instead of the freeway. In practice this means that
any amount of communication will lead to either the second
or the third rule to be prioritized over the first. However, if
we raise the trustworthiness of the default rule, then it may
be prioritized if there is high uncertainty about the beliefs
(ergo, the trustworthiness is low). This allows an agent to
reason about the trustworthiness of its available information.
This default rule is not chosen arbitrarily. In a real setting,
this default choice to take the freeway comes from some prior
information, for instance, historical data such as that used
by Kraus et al. [4]. The trustworthiness associated with this
rule corresponds to the trust the agent puts in this data. In
this case, while defaulting to taking the freeway, the agent
has no trust in this action and any other information may
change it. However, if an agent were to have more trust in
the default choice, then it could raise this value: in this case
the communication must be more trustworthy in order to
override the default rule.
C. Communication and deception
As mentioned in the introduction, deceitful drivers who
have some form of a priori information about the state of
the freeway can improve their travel time by lying about
this information. If there is congestion, then they want as
few people as possible on the side road, so will try to
deceive others into believing the freeway is clear. In the
reverse situation, if there is no congestion, then the fewer
drivers on the freeway, the better, however minimal the gain.
Either situation is severely detrimental to a naive driver who
believes the communication.
Nevertheless, not all drivers act in their own best interest
all the time. Because communication in cars is a new
technology, no research has been done yet on whether drivers
send trustworthy communication (or their intelligent agents
do that on their behalf). Instead we rely on research done
on altruism in traffic in a broader sense. Mujcic et al. [14]
found that 40% of drivers cede way at intersections when
they do not have to. Other researchers find similar numbers,
or lower of altruistic drivers in traffic scenarios. We will run
experiments with different numbers of altruistic agents, and
adopt a baseline of 40% for the results in Table I.
There are two opportunities for communication. The first
round is before the simulation starts, and the second is before
the second choice point in node B of Figure 1b. In the
second round of communication, all agents have additionally
received information about the true state of the first stretch of
freeway, allowing them to assess the trustworthiness of the
first round of communication. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume the population is homogenous and the percentage of
altruistic agents stays at the same throughout the simulation.
D. Results
The experiment serves firstly to demonstrate that deceitful
behaviour has a detrimental effect upon traffic flow in the
network, and secondly to show that our method for reasoning
about the trustworthiness of information allows agents to
improve their performance.
1) The use of trust: We run the simulation scenario with
four different settings. The first is that none of the agents
have any prior information about the state of the roads. The
second is to provide 20% of the agents with truthful prior
knowledge about the state of the freeway. In the third setting,
we add the ability to communicate: 60 % of the agents are
deceitful. Without trust, we use a simple majority vote to
interpret the C2C communication. Finally we allow agents
to use trust and reasoning to interpret C2C communication.
In this final setting, the trust model needs to be initialized
with a default value for trust. We use a naive setting: before
being able to evaluate, C2C communication is a fully trusted
information source. The results can be found in Table I for
two different traffic scenarios: one with, and one without
congestion on the freeway.
The first thing to note is that if there is no congestion, then
deceitful agents gain little from lying to others, however the
agents who rely entirely on C2C communication for their
information about the state of the freeway are tricked into
taking the sideroad, resulting in their travel time doubling. So
while it may not be worthwhile for the deceitful agents, the
victims of the deception are significantly affected. In the case
of a congested freeway the reverse is true: the agents without
information were going to get stuck in the traffic jam on the
freeway in any case. Similarly, the deceitful agents with prior
knowledge of the congestion were going to take the side road
in any case, so in this case their deceitful communication
alone does not have any affect on the performance.
No congestion Both freeway edges congested
Average Deceitful Others Average Deceitful Others
No knowledge 2.65 22.35
Knowledge, no communication 2.65 2.65a 17.75 6.08a
Knowledge, communication 5.94 2.03 6.90 17.75 6.08 20.64
Knowledge, communication and trust 4.28 2.34 4.77 12.85 7.02 14.31
a There is no communication, so these are all of the agents (20%) who have knowledge about congestion.
TABLE I: Travel time through graph of Figure 1b using different settings
When using trust and possibilistic reasoning to interpret
the communication and act accordingly, we see the situation
changes significantly. The cars trust the information (erro-
neously) in the first round of C2C communication, but in the
second round, they are able to adjust and obtain the under-
lying truth. This mitigates the negative impact of deceitful
communication in the case where there is no congestion,
and significantly improves agents’ performance when there
is congestion, if they rely only on C2C communication.
2) Balancing information sources: The way our trust
model works, the smaller the minority group, regardless of
whether they are truthful or lying agents, the higher the trust
we can place in VANET communication. The 40% truthful
agents is thus not a favourable example for us, as the agents
have very low trustworthiness in communication. If 50% of
the agents are truthful, then we can say nothing at all about
the trustworthyness of the VANET. The further from 50%,
the better we can estimate the trustworthiness of the VANET.
In order to decide whether to use the communicated
information, the trustworthiness in the default choice is given
by prior reasoning about some statistical data regarding the
expected state of the freeway. Because the environment is
dynamic, and the trust model is capable of adapting over
time, it may be the case that in some situations the ad-
hoc communication over the VANET overrides the default
choice, while at others, trust in the VANET is low and the
agent advises the car to follow the default choice. This is
precisely the kind of adaptive behaviour that we wish to
obtain by using a possibilistic BDI agent.
IV. DISCUSSION
The experiment in the previous section is a proof-of-
concept demonstration of the framework for reasoning about
C2C communication. We show that under some basic as-
sumptions about the behaviour of traffic, selfish, deceitful
agents have a significant impact on traffic flow. Furthermore,
our framework is able to learn how to interpret deceitful in-
formation and improve the agent’s functioning. Nevertheless,
we acknowledge that further experimentation is necessary.
Particularly in a microsimulation, where it is possible to gen-
erate numerous different behaviours, which can change over
time. In addition, we intend to gather data about how human
participants in traffic use the ability to deceive when being
able to communicate easily between each other, in order to
calibrate the experimentation scenario better. Furthermore,
C2C communication should be considered within the overall
problem of congestion management: it is not clear what cars
should communicate and when, even if the information is
trustworthy.
The framework we proposed performs well in a homoge-
nous population, but it may be possible to consider C2C
communication as not simply a single source of information,
but make a more fine-grained distinction. While we cannot
evaluate each car’s trustworthiness individually, there may
be some characteristics that can be associated with trustwor-
thy behaviour: for instance, cars traveling in the opposite
direction on the freeway have less incentive to lie about
congestion than cars traveling in the same direction. This
could be achieved by a richer modeling of other agents in
the system, including their possible goals.
C2C communication through VANETs is a valuable tool
for providing drivers with more, and more accurate informa-
tion. However, to process this information it is necessary to
take into account that it may be false and to reason about
what to present to the user. We presented a comprehensive
framework for doing so.
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